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Focused on risk-sharing, in this thesis, what risks can be shared by supply chain 
members is analyzed, the reasonability of supply chain risk-sharing is demonstrated 
and a risk-sharing mechanism is put forward and its validity in various situations is 
verified. 
Firstly, based on a detailed description and classification of the supply chain risks, 
this thesis discusses the classification of the shared risks and unshared risks of the 
supply chain and proposes that the risks caused by the factors which are external to 
the enterprise but internal ones to the supply chain can be shared by the members in 
the supply chain. The paper also points out that the risks caused by the market 
uncertainty should draw more attention.  
Secondly, by applying the principal-agent theory, the thesis demonstrates that 
sharing risks among supply chain members is reasonable. Research shows that adding 
risk-sharing clauses to the optimal incentives contract is reasonable because 
risk-sharing clauses include much more relevant information. By using this relevant 
information, the principal can rule out the more interference of external factors, 
provide more information about agent’s action and achieve the purpose of lowering 
down the risk costs and incentive costs and therefore reducing the general agent costs. 
Finally, options are used to manage market risks and the validity of option 
contract as a risk-sharing mechanism is demonstrated when the retailer is risk-neutral 
or he has decision-making preferences. Research shows that option contracts can not 
make members of the supply chain coordinate and share risks when the retailer has 
the extremely high risk-averse preferences. In other cases, option contract is an 
effective risk-sharing mechanism. Because in these cases, applying options in the 
management of supply chain market risks can increase the overall performance and 
efficiency of the supply chain, make supply chain members coordinate and share risks 
and thereby reach a win-win situation. The coordination among the members of the 













that the option price equals that in the risk-neutral situation when the retailer has 
waste-averse preferences. The second situation is that the option price is higher than 
that in the risk-neutral situation when the retailer has stockout-averse preferences. 
And the last one is that the option price is lower than that in the risk-neutral situation 
when the retailer has other decision-making preferences. 
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由 12%降至 9%， 终导致其将手机业务外包；2001 年的 9.11 事件，2002 年的西
海岸码头工人罢工事件，2003 年年初 SAS 在我国的爆发，都冲击了脆弱的供应
链系统。由此可知产业的供应链是环环相扣的，任何一个环节出现问题，都可能
影响供应链的正常运作。因此，供应链风险管理值得企业管理者充分重视。 
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